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S. was a bit horrified by Rusca's childlike innocence in chattering indiscreetly about things, and asked me if I saw Mr. D. to tell him, first (sincerely) how much S. likes and esteems him, and secondly to warn him that the Ticinesi are just like the Italians, awful gossips, and you have to be careful about what you tell them.

I'll do my best in my prolix way, to interpret what the man in the train meant about unconditional capitulation. It was not according to him but according to Mr. D. (or so I gathered from a remark he made last time) that Grandi might play intermediary. S. meant: if the Allies do have any dealings with Grandi, they must be purely technical ones connected with arranging the signing of capitulation, etc. This would not compromise the Allies, obviously one must get into contact with the enemy if he is going to capitulate, but any form of political collaboration with Grandi & Co., after the capitulation has been arranged, would discredit the Allies horribly, apart from the fact that it would not solve anything but simply defer the evil day and exasperate the Italians.

At Casablanca the President said "unconditional surrender". S. thinks the Allies ought absolutely to stick to that phrase when it comes to negotiations for capitulation with the Fascists. No conditions for them. No discussions with them over the green table, no getting together. They made the war, now they have lost it. The phrase "unconditional surrender" is absolutely right - for them. Just as when Pétain met Hitler about the armistice, there was no discussion then of French internal policy in the future, simply the military conditions, occupation